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The SALS Working Party on Ethics and Lawyer Fee 
Arrangements' first report ('The ethics of conditional 
fee arrangements') will be launched at a SALS seminar 
early in the new year. The working party, chaired by 
Richard Southwell QC, includes among its members a 
High Court judge, senior solicitors, barristers and 
academics specialising in legal ethics.
To order your copy of the report or attend the 
seminar, please contact the Society for Advanced Legal 
Studies (tel: 020 7862 5865 fax: 020 7862 5855; 
email: sals@sas.ac.uk).
ETHICS AND CONDITIONAL FEE 
AGREEMENTS
Until now, debates on conditional fee arrangements (CFAs) 
have focused on the access to justice implications of replacing 
legal aid. This is a paradigm shift in the resourcing of civil 
cases, which the Government argues will increase access to 
justice across all income groups. There are two elements of 
this change which deserve stronger attention. The first is theo fc>
effect of heightening lawyers' self-interest in the cases that 
they take on. This is not simply an unwanted by-product of a 
shift to CFAs. It is a deliberate attempt to ensure lawyers share 
the risks of litigation with clients, but it raises crucialo '
problems. The second element is the involvement of 
insurance companies in the funding of justice.
There are virtues and problems in the CFA approach. 
Insurers understandably take a narrow commercial view of 
risk which means the harder or more costly cases are 
discouraged regardless of a broader notion of the interests of
o o
justice. It is likely that worries about risk will mean that 
insurance acts as a heavy filter on the more difficult cases, 
while providing an affordable route to courts for people who 
would not previously have qualified for legal aid. Similarly, 
some extra money is freed up for other areas of legal aid 
expenditure.
These pros and cons are well-explored, but the ethical 
dilemmas faced by lawyers operating under CFAs are new. As 
a result, the need to understand and evaluate them is pressing. 
CFAs raise inevitable and sometimes serious conflicts of 
interest between clients and lawyers.
A strong undercurrent in the report is that simply restating 
a lawyer's ethical duties to the court and to the client is not 
sufficient to address the problems caused by CFAs. CFAs may 
have brought real benefits to some clients, but the 
commercialisation of key aspects of the justice process bring 
attendant dangers which need closer scrutiny. The existence 
of lawyers' strong financial interests in the outcome of cases, 
will heighten pre-existing tensions in the lawyer-client 
relationship, and create new conflicts of interest. 
Furthermore, the financial interests of insurance companies, 
which will now occupy a central role on both sides in legal 
actions, will have a profound impact on access to justice and 
the ethics of practice. Insurance companies underwriting 
claims under CFAs have very similar interests to insurance 
companies defending those claims: they want to win or they 
want the to settle early. Only the latter option minimises their 
risk. That is the most worrying of the conflicts of interest.J o
New systems for organising the funding of legal services need 
clear conduct rules to balance the interests of parties' lawyers, 
insurers and ultimately justice.
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